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Abstract 
The process of approximation between the EU and its ‘eastern neighbourhood’ has created 
conditions for deepening economic interactions and market integration, giving to the EU –
and to EU businesses– an elevated role in the process of economic modernisation and 
transition in the neighbourhood countries. This raises the question as to whether European 
business activity in these countries produces indeed measureable economic advantages both 
in absolute and in relative terms (e.g., compared to business activity from other parts of the 
world). Similarly, a question arises as to whether European business activity reduces or 
amplifies spatial imbalances within the partner countries. This paper examines these issues 
for the case of capital flows (foreign ownership) and the related productivity spillovers, using 
firm-level data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
covering 28 transition countries over the period 2002-2009. We estimate the direct and intra-
industry productivity effects of foreign ownership and examine how these differ across 
regional blocks (CEE, SEE and ENP), according to the origin of the foreign investor (EU 
versus non-EU), across geographical scales (pure industry versus regional spillovers) and for 
different types of locations (capital-city regions versus the rest). Our results suggest that FDI 
of EU origin plays a distinctive role in the countries concerned helping raise domestic 
productivity significantly more than investments from outside the EU. However, this process 
appears to operate in a spatially selective manner, thus enhancing regional disparities and 
spatial imbalances. This, then, assigns a particular responsibility for EU policy, as it continues 
to promote economic integration (and FDI flows) to its eastern neighbourhood, to devise 
interventions that will help redress these problems. 
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Origin of FDI and domestic productivity 
spillovers: does European FDI have a 
‘productivity advantage’ in the ENP 
countries? 
 
Introduction 
The collapse of communism more than 20 years ago unleashed a historically 
unprecedented process of economic restructuring and political transformation 
in the former communist countries. This process of transition involved a 
number of radical changes both in the political (democratisation, institution-
building) and the economic sphere (marketization, liberalisation, 
restructuring). In this process, the inflow of foreign direct investments has 
obtained a heightened importance, not only in its role of removing capital 
shortages, containing current account imbalances and strengthening job 
creation, technology transfers and economic development (Fry et al, 1995; 
Markusen and Venables, 1999), but also for the effectiveness of, and 
commitment to, transition itself (Grabbe, 2006).  
The process of transition was soon followed by – and in many respects 
became subordinated to – the process of approximation to the EU. Indeed, as 
early as in 1993, the EU effectively defined the process and content of 
transition with the establishment of the Copenhagen Criteria for accession. 
Whether intentionally or not, these became the guiding principles for 
successful transition and have been followed, albeit with variable degrees of 
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success or commitment, by virtually all transition countries in the broader 
European neighbourhood.  
The effectiveness, or even relevance, of the EU and its framework of external 
relations for the countries in its broader neighbourhood has been an issue that 
has attracted a lot of attention in the literature. The success of this framework 
in fostering political-economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) in the pre-accession period (Hughes et al, 2004; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005) and especially in facilitating economic integration with the 
western ‘EU core’, inspired to a large extent the deployment of similar 
frameworks in countries further afield. In the Balkans (SEE), this took the 
form of ‘extended conditionality’ through the Stabilisation and Association 
process, to account for the specificities of the region relating to the conflict 
resolution initiatives following the wars of the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
(Phinnemore, 2003; Talani, 2008; Monastiriotis and Petrakos, 2010). In the 
eastern neighbourhood (as well as in the South Mediterranean), this 
framework was translated into what became known as the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This policy offers conditional preferential 
economic and political relations in exchange of the recipient countries’ 
adherence to the ENP (and Copenhagen) principles; but, as has been long 
identified in the literature (Emerson, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008; 
Sasse, 2008; Witman and Wolff, 2010), with a significantly weakened ‘carrot’ 
as the ENP framework explicitly excludes the prospect of accession.  
Studies on the economics of the 2004 Enlargement (Brendon et al, 1999; 
Kaminski, 2001; Clausing and Dorobantu, 2005; Monastiriotis and 
Agiomirgianakis, 2009) have shown that this prospect of accession has been 
paramount in mobilising foreign investments, as western firms responded to 
the opportunities offered by the opening of the new markets by changing the 
geographical organisation of their production thus instigating a wider process 
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of restructuring for the European industry. As a result, these movements were 
part of a deeper integration process, reflecting the significant linkages that 
developed on the ground, which in turn facilitated sizeable technology 
transfers to the CEECs. In the countries of the wider neighbourhood and in 
the absence of the prospect of accession, this process was less intense and 
partly driven by different motives (Estrin and Uvalic, 2013). Volumes of FDI 
have been significantly lower; foreign investments have been more of the 
market-capture type and much less so part of a spatial reorganisation of 
production systems; and, as a result, the extent of integration with the local 
economies has been somewhat lower. Still, the ENP provides an institutional 
framework of association (including preferential trade agreements) which, 
arguably, gives EU firms a relative advantage at least in the sense of reducing 
entry costs and uncertainties (information asymmetries, legal barriers, etc).  
If, as it is believed to have happened in the CEECs, the framework of 
association facilitates less speculative and more long-term strategic 
investments, then EU-originating investments in the ENP region are likely to 
be more organically linked to the local economies of the host countries thus, 
possibly, generating larger spillovers for domestic firms. In this paper we 
examine this hypothesis using firm-level data for the period 2002-2009 
covering 28 transition countries. We apply a standard production-function 
approach to estimate the productivity spillovers accruing to domestic firms 
by the presence of foreign investments and examine how these spillovers vary 
(a) for groups of countries belonging to different processes with respect to EU 
association and (b) separately for investments of EU and non-EU origin. As 
spillovers are found to be of variable sizes along these dimensions at the 
national level (within sectors), we further investigate the localisation of these 
spillovers by examining how their intensity varies at different geographical 
scales (national – regional) and for different types of locations (capitals versus 
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the rest). The next section introduces in more detail our research questions, 
also discussing some theoretical considerations and reviewing parts of the 
literature that are relevant for the motivation of our analysis. Section 3 gives 
details about our data and method, while section 4 presents our empirical 
results. The last section concludes with a discussion of the policy implications 
of our findings.  
 
Considerations for the analysis 
There is by now a large body of literature examining the impact of FDI in 
transition countries, both at the aggregate level and in terms of intra- and 
inter-industry spillovers. The literature has shown that, generally, vertical 
spillovers (through backward and forward linkages to the sector of foreign 
presence) are positive and often sizeable (Damijan et al, 2003; Javorcik, 2004; 
Gorodnichenko et al, 2007; Nicolini and Resmini, 2010; Damijan et al, 2013). In 
contrast, estimated horizontal (intra-industry) spillovers are often non-
significant or even negative (Konings, 2001; Damijan et al, 2003; Javorcik, 
2004; Sabirianova et al, 2005; Gorodnichenko et al, 2007) – similar with 
established findings in other parts of the world (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; 
Blomstrom and Sjoholm, 1999). More recent studies, however, have shown 
that significant positive spillovers do exist, but only conditional on a number 
of intervening factors1, including firm/sector characteristics (such as firm size 
– Pojar, 2012, Damijan et al, 2013; absorptive capacity and technological 
distance – Tytell and Yodaeva, 2005, Gorodnichenko et al, 2007, Halpern and 
Murakozy, 2007, Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011; sector and geographical 
location – Sgard, 2001, Gorg and Greenaway, 2004, Monastiriotis and Jordaan, 
                                                        
1 See Gorg and Strobl (2001) for a discussion of this, based on a meta-analysis of studies mainly 
in the 1990s. See also Merlevede and Schoors (2007) and the review in Damijan et al (2013).  
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2010); characteristics of the recipient country (level of development, extent of 
corruption, political regime – Tytell and Yodaeva, 2005); and characteristics 
related to the foreign investors (extent of ownership – Javorcik, 2004, 
Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011; export-orientation – Tytell and Yodaeva, 
2005; country/region of origin – Javorcik and Spatareanou, 2011, Monastiriotis 
and Alegria, 2011). Additionally, Jordaan (2013a and 2013b) has shown that 
estimates of horizontal spillovers often suffer from problems of selection and 
endogeneity; whereas Monastiriotis and Alegria (2011) find evidence of a 
time-varying spillover effect (which they call hysteresis), consistent with more 
micro-level evidence showing that foreign-owned firms increase their 
domestic linkages with the passage of time (Gorg and Ruane, 2001). 
Our attention in this paper deviates from what has come to be the main 
attention in the contemporary literature on the topic, namely issues such as 
absorptive capacity and technological distance (Damijan et al, 2013), the 
nature of backward and forward linkages (Barrios et al, 2011) and the role of 
domestic institutions (Farole and Winkler, 2012). Instead, our focus is with 
two issues that have attracted less attention in the transition literature, both 
relating to questions of geography and space – albeit in different dimensions. 
The first concerns the role of the origin of foreign investments for the size of 
the observed spillovers; the second concerns the geography of spillovers within 
the recipient countries.  
 
i. Origin of FDI 
Concerning the first issue, there is evidence already in the literature that the 
origin of investors matters for the size and direction of the spillovers 
generated (Javorcik and Spatareanou, 2011, Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011). 
There are two separate arguments to explain this. In the case of Javorcik and 
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Spatareanou (2011), in an argument that is more akin to the case of vertical 
spillovers, the mechanism of interest is the presumed higher propensity of 
foreign investors originating from more distant locations to make more 
intensive use of local resources and local supply chains (as maintaining 
traditional home-country suppliers becomes more costly with distance), thus 
producing more intense interactions with the local production base. This, it is 
hypothesised (and consistent evidence is presented), leads to stronger vertical 
spillovers for more distant foreign investors. Instead, the argument presented 
by Monastiriotis and Alegria (2011) has to do more with cultural and 
technological proximity. According to this argument, culturally ‘proximate’ 
foreign investors have a greater advantage in drawing on local knowledge 
and thus benefit more by engaging more systematically with the local 
economy. This, in turn, creates a greater scope for spillovers to local firms – 
which may, additionally, be easier to absorb, to the extent at least that cultural 
proximity correlates with technological proximity.2 Although the authors 
argue that this mechanism applies more clearly to the case of horizontal 
spillovers, an extension of this argument to the case of vertical spillovers 
appears straightforward.  
Thus, on the issue of ‘origin’, two conflicting arguments – both supported by 
relevant empirical evidence – have been proposed in the literature. Our 
empirical analysis in this paper provides some additional evidence for the 
role of the origin of the investors and in this sense adds to this developing 
literature. Our conceptualisation of the role of ‘origin’ however is not fully in 
line with the definitions used in the previous literature. Instead of pure 
geographical distance (Javorcik and Spatareanou, 2011) and relational cultural 
proximity (Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011), our aim in this paper is to 
                                                        
2 The example used by Monastiriotis and Alegria (2011) is the case of Greek-owned firms in 
Bulgaria. The authors find a significant (in terms of the size of spillovers) advantage for Greek 
compared to both European (rest of EU) and non-European FDI.  
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examine the role played by political-institutional proximity, especially in 
relation to the process of EU approximation (be it in the context of accession – 
CEE; of pre-accession conditionality – SEE; or of neighbourliness – ENP). The 
hypothesis we put forward is that FDI originating from the EU will have 
greater productivity spillovers to the local economies of the ENP/association 
countries, for a number of reasons. First, because EU-originating investors are 
likely to see their investments as part of the approximation process and, in 
this sense, as part of a policy that aims at strengthening local capacities and 
integration with the EU. Thus, local links are encouraged and local synergies 
pursued. Second, because domestic producers may have similar perceptions 
about EU-originating investments and thus may be more inclined to 
cooperate and/or compete with these – resulting in more intensive processes 
of mimicking, learning and technology transfer. Third, because the very 
process of association may be creating institutional advantages that can be 
better internalised by European firms (e.g., transposition of legal frameworks 
and regulations to come more in line with EU norms and rules – Magen, 2006; 
Freyburg et al, 2009), which may also be giving a stronger advantage to EU-
originating investors (inversely, to local firms) in their interaction with the 
local economy (with the European investors). Given the differentiation in the 
process and intensity of association between the EU and each of our three 
geo-political regions (CEE, SEE and ENP), we also derive group-specific 
estimates for the impact of European (EU15) and non-European FDI for each 
of these three regions.  
 
ii. Scale and regional differentiation of spillovers 
Surprisingly, the literature on FDI has much less to say about the geography 
of spillovers and the geographical impact of foreign ownership on (local) 
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domestic production. This is despite the voluminous research on the issue of 
locational spillovers in the agglomeration economics literature (for example, 
Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Greenstone et al, 2008; Puga, 2010). Among the 
few exceptions to this, see the work of Driffield and Hughes (2003), Haskel et 
al (2007) and Girma and Wakelin (2009) for the UK3; Mullen and Williams 
(2007) for the case of the USA; Sgard (2001) for Hungary; Jordaan (2008 and 
2013b) for Mexico; and especially of Monastiriotis and Jordaan (2010), whose 
work on Greece has shown that productivity spillovers from foreign 
ownership are not only stronger at the more localised level but also vary 
widely, and can even move in different directions, across different (types of) 
locations.4  
Consistent with the brevity of empirical studies (and evidence) on the issue, 
also limited is the discussion about the theoretical mechanisms that may – or 
may not – be causing spatial differentiation in the local impact (spillovers) of 
FDI.5 The main mechanism to be found in the literature – which is directly 
borrowed from the agglomeration economics literature – concerns the effects 
of concentration on local production through knowledge spillovers, labour 
pooling and network-sharing (Griliches, 1979; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; 
Breschi et al, 2010; Marioti et al, 2010; Overman and Puga, 2010). If 
advantages from the presence of foreign firms have to do with processes such 
as the upgrading of workforce skills (either through training or by raising the 
demand for – and thus the investment in – skills in the local economy), day-
to-day interaction (participation in common Chambers, demonstration effects, 
information-sharing) and pecuniary spillovers (demand-supply linkages, 
                                                        
3 Among these studies, Haskel et al (2007) find consistently negligible regional effects from 
foreign ownership. This finding is rare, but consistent with earlier findings in the literature for 
less developed countries (Sjoholm, 1999, Aitken and Harrison, 1999).  
4 See also Gorg and Greenaway (2004) for a meta-analysis of relevant studies, including ones that 
look at the role of geographical proximity to foreign-owned firms.  
5 This is partly because theoretical considerations in this literature concern more the question of 
the origin and types of spillovers (e.g., pecuniary versus technological – see Gorg and Strobl, 
2004, and Jordaan, 2009).  
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sharing common distribution networks, etc.), it is easy to see why (co-
)location would matter for the size and intensity of spillovers. If, on the other 
hand, foreign presence raises domestic productivity through technological 
spillovers (e.g., introduction of new technologies, processes and management 
practices, which are subsequently copied by local firms) and competition 
effects (creative destruction, survival of the fittest), then the resulting 
spillovers need not be at all localised – as learning and competition can take 
place at wider scales and/or through trade and are thus not necessarily 
linearly related to distance. Still, to the extent that knowledge spillovers are 
localised, it should be expected that the technological externalities of FDI will 
also be stronger with geographical proximity.  
Another, less studied, mechanism accounting for the spatial differentiation of 
spillovers has to do with the capacities and characteristics of the recipient 
local economies.6 More developed regions (often, those of Capital cities) are in 
general more extrovert and typically host larger agglomerations. In a way this 
means that they are already open to forces of (international) competition (and 
learning), more so than their national hinterlands. If so, the scope for benefits 
derived from the presence of foreign firms, both locally and nationally, may 
be more limited.7 On the other hand, these areas will have a greater capacity 
to internalise any spillovers that may be generated and to withstand the 
additional competition from the foreign investors (e.g., managing to maintain 
their market shares). In this sense, the inflow of foreign investments may 
exacerbate existing spatial disparities in the recipient countries. The literature 
provides two sets of findings with regard to this. On the one hand, the studies 
by Driffield and Munday (2001) and Sgrad (2001) give evidence of stronger 
FDI spillovers in areas with larger agglomerations, higher levels of 
                                                        
6 For exceptions see Sgard (2001), Driffield and Munday (2001), Jordaan (2008) and 
Monastiriotis and Jordaan (2010).  
7 Inversely, more peripheral regions will have more to gain from the technological knowledge of 
foreign firms and perhaps may benefit more also from pecuniary spillovers.  
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development and greater proximity to markets. On the other hand, 
Monastiriotis and Jordaan (2010) have shown for the case of Greece that 
spillovers are maximised in areas with weaker agglomerations and lower 
levels of development. In our analysis we also examine this dimension, by 
estimating the productivity spillovers of foreign ownership separately for the 
capital-city regions and for the regions located elsewhere. 
 
Data and methodology 
The data used in this paper comes from the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). This survey is implemented by the 
EBRD together with the World Bank and it enquires individual firms in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia about their business and business 
environment. The paper uses an unbalanced panel from three waves – 2002, 
2005 and 2009 – containing approximately 28,000 observations8 from 28 
transition countries, listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix.  
The dataset contains information on sales, employment, fixed assets, share of 
foreign ownership, share of exports, sector (using NACE two-digit 
classification), country and region where the firm is located and origin of FDI. 
The availability of some of these variables (share and nationality of foreign 
presence; region; sector) is limited to certain years so, where available, we 
projected the values available in previous years or in the cross-sectional 
editions of BEEPS (e.g., assuming that the region, sector, or share of foreign 
                                                        
8 The dataset contains many missing values and some occasional problems with coding. After 
cleaning the data we are left with 22,009 observations with data on sales (output) and 
employment and information on ownership and sector. This number is approximately halved 
when we use the ‘fixed assets’ variable, as there are large gaps in the reporting of this 
information (questions 6a, 6b, 7a and 7b in the BEEPS). Sample sizes vary notably across 
countries, with only 82 observations in Montenegro and between 1,000 and 1,600 observations 
in Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Poland, Romania, Kazakhstan and Croatia.  
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ownership has not changed between two survey years). Some data-points on 
employment and capital have also been estimated, using either interpolations 
(when information was missing for an intermediate year) or projections.9  
Our main independent variable – the share of foreign-owned production in 
the sector, which for convenience we interchangeably label as ‘horizontal FDI’ 
– has been constructed using each individual firm’s reported share of foreign 
ownership and information on country, sector and yearly output of each firm. 
Firm-level output was first multiplied by each firm’s foreign-ownership share 
and aggregated to country-sector-year clusters. Our ‘horizontal FDI’ measure 
was then calculated as the ratio of this variable to total output in the cluster. 
The same approach was followed for the construction of our origin- and 
region- specific measures. We have favoured this output-based definition 
against alternative measures (e.g., employment shares of foreign-owned 
firms) because there are significant differences in labour productivity between 
foreign-owned and domestic firms in our sample and thus employment-share 
differences do not adequately reflect the importance of foreign presence in a 
sector. To separate between foreign-owned and domestic firms (e.g., in our 
regression specifications), we have used a minimum threshold (>10%) 
definition.10 On the basis of this definition, foreign-owned firms in our sample 
are between 10% and 20% of the total number of firms (across countries) – 
although for some countries the share of foreign ownership is much lower 
(e.g., 3% in Turkey). Globally, the (unweighted) share of total sales accounted 
for by foreign ownership is 17.9% (of which 31% is of EU origin), although 
this ranges from 4.5% in Turkey to 36.1% in Latvia (see Table A.1 in 
Appendix). In firms with foreign presence, the average (unweighted) share of 
                                                        
9 For example, missing data on employment for individual firms where predicted using available 
values for other years multiplied by the corresponding average rate of employment growth in the 
firm’s year-region-sector cluster. This affected only 61 observations and in the aggregate-level 
analysis has no influence on the obtained results.  
10 Alternative definitions (any foreign ownership (>0%); majority ownership (>50%); and full 
ownership (>99%)) were also tested but are not our focus in this paper.  
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foreign ownership is 73.9% (80.9% for EU-owned firms), ranging between 
61.7% in Chemicals and 86.7% in Business services and between 56.7% in 
Turkey and 89.9% in Montenegro.  
In our empirical analysis we use this data and estimate a standard 
production-function model that incorporates, in addition to the two main 
factors of production (capital, measured by fixed assets, and labour), the share 
of foreign presence in the sector where each firm is located. Additionally, the 
model includes various controls for the different dimensions of the sample, 
for example fixed-effects for countries and years. Our base estimating model 
is 
 
where  is output; k is capital; l is employment; h is our measure of horizontal 
FDI; Dc is a vector of binary dummies for countries; Dt is a vector of time fixed 
effects; e is a normally distributed error; and the b’s are parameters to be 
estimated.  
Given our controls for the factors of production, the parameter on the 
horizontal FDI variable gives the effect of foreign presence in the sector (or in 
the sector-region) on firm’s i total factor productivity.11 Because this variable 
is measured at the sectoral level, in our empirical analysis we cluster the 
standard errors across sectors (and, where appropriate, sector-regions). We 
estimate this model using alternatively OLS and fixed-effects (within) 
estimators, the latter in order to correct for the non-independence of repeated 
observations (firms) over time. The fixed effects estimation controls for 
unobserved firm-specific characteristics (e.g., management quality) but 
                                                        
11 Some studies correct for a possible endogeneity problem whereby firms, knowing their 
underlying productivity, invest selectively in capital so that more productive firms have higher 
levels of capital. This tends to inflate the capital parameter and to underestimate the measured 
TFP advantage of more productive firms. Unless, however, this selection operates along sectoral 
lines, it is not clear what its impact is on the parameter of interest (for horizontal FDI).  
Vassilis Monastiriotis 
17 
effectively removes from our estimating sample all those firms that only 
appear in the sample once. Thus, although we discuss the fixed-effects 
estimates, our main interest in the analysis is with the OLS full-sample results.  
 
Empirical results 
i. Aggregate effects 
We start our empirical analysis with an exploration of the general effects of 
foreign-ownership on firm productivity, focusing in particular on the form 
that these effects take, namely internal versus external and linear versus non-
linear (Table 1). As can be seen, the direct (internal) effect of foreign presence 
is positive and highly significant: firms with higher foreign ownership shares 
appear to have higher productivity. However, when we control for firm-
specific time-invariant characteristics (second column), this effect loses its 
significance. This suggests that the positive association found in column 1 
may in fact be due to a selection mechanism, whereby foreign investors 
channel their investments to high-productivity firms. Either way, the external 
effect of foreign ownership (horizontal FDI spillover) is negative and not 
statistically significant, although it does become statistically significant when 
we introduce interactive country-year fixed effects (col.3; sample restricted to 
domestic firms only), which account for time-varying country differences (e.g. 
in inflation rates). Interestingly, adding sectoral fixed-effects to this 
specification (col.4) weakens the adverse effect of horizontal FDI, suggesting 
an inverse selection into sectors (with low-productivity sectors having higher 
foreign presence, ceteris paribus).  
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Table 1. Base regressions: impact of foreign ownership on firm productivity  
 Dependent: 
log(sales) 
(1) 
all 
(2) 
all 
(3) 
native 
(4) 
native 
(5) 
native 
(6) 
fs<10% 
(7) 
fs>10% 
(8) 
fs>50% 
Employment (log) 0.826
a
 0.485
a
 0.831
 a
 0.852
 a
 0.460
 a
 0.858
 a
 0.851
 a
 0.833
 a
 
 (0.013) (0.036) (0.013) (0.013) (0.039) (0.016) (0.016) (0.036) 
Fixed assets (log) 0.190
 a
 0.087
 a
 0.189
 a
 0.183
 a
 0.073
 a
 0.178
 a
 0.183
 a
 0.163
 a
 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.054) 
Foreign share 
(own) 
0.373
 a
 0.239       
(0.042) (0.183)       
Foreign share 
(sector) 
-0.040 -0.059 -0.204
 b
 -0.125
 b
 0.420 0.135 -0.171
 b
 -0.856
 b
 
(0.090) (0.130) (0.074) (0.056) (0.406) (0.595) (0.060) (0.377) 
Foreign share 
squared (sector) 
    -0.905
c
    
    (0.545)    
Constant 7.572
 a
 10.10
 a
 7.444
 a
 7.133
 a
 10.27
 a
 7.161
 a
 7.109
 a
 5.981
 a
 
 (0.285) (0.234) (0.337) (0.266) (0.257) (0.240) (0.252) (0.428) 
Fixed effects C, Y F, Y C(x)Y C(x)Y, S F, Y C(x)Y, S C(x)Y, S C(x)Y, S 
Observations 10,692 10,692 9,292 9,292 9,292 4,871 4,421 814 
R-squared 0.802 0.660 0.808 0.825 0.638 0.831 0.823 0.805 
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered within sectors) in parentheses; a, b and c show 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Fixed effects correspond to countries (C), years (Y), 
firms (F) and sectors (S). See text for further details on estimation method and types of controls.  
 
Interestingly, this negative effect of horizontal FDI seems to be driven by high 
concentrations of foreign presence. We examine this in two ways. First, by 
introducing a quadratic term into our model (col.5). Here, the linear term is 
now positive (but insignificant) while the quadratic term is negative and 
statistically significant (at 10%). Within-sample predictions suggest that the 
joint effect only turns negative for sectoral foreign-ownership shares of over 
45% and it reaches an economically notable size (elasticity of over 0.1) only for 
values of foreign ownership beyond 65%. Second, in columns 6-8 we split our 
estimating sample into three sub-samples comprising of firms in sectors with 
below-median values of foreign presence (col.6), above-median values of 
foreign presence (col.7) and values of foreign presence above the mid-point of 
all possible values (50% - col.8). As can be seen, the estimated impact of 
horizontal FDI in low-FDI sectors is positive (but insignificant statistically). 
Instead, it is negative (and significant at 5%) in sectors with above-median 
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foreign shares, with the impact increasing in magnitude as we restrict our 
sample to sectors with very high concentrations of FDI (col.8).  
All in all, the evidence from Table 1 suggests that, in our sample countries, 
foreign investments offer little benefits to the sectors in which they locate12: 
there is a direct positive effect for the firms receiving these investments and 
some evidence of positive spillovers in sectors with low foreign presence 
(although these are never statistically significant); firms in sectors with 
significant foreign presence show in fact lower productivity, while this effect 
rises dramatically for firms in sectors that are dominated by foreign-owned 
production (over 50%). As our regressions include controls for sectoral fixed 
effects (and, from results not shown, also of firm-specific fixed effects), it 
appears that this is not a compositional effect (whereby high foreign presence 
creams off, through take-overs, or crowds out, through exit, domestic high-
productivity firms) but rather due to a pure negative externality.  
 
ii. Impact of origin and destination  
As noted earlier, our interest is with how the impact of foreign ownership 
varies across space – both in its supra-national and in its sub-national 
dimension. Table 2 reports our results concerning the former, where we 
examine specifically the role played by EU-originating FDI and the 
differentiation of its effects across different regional blocks of the ‘European 
neighbourhood’. We start with the linear model used above including three-
way fixed effects (for sectors, countries and years). In line with our prior 
expectations, European FDI appears to have indeed a remarkably different 
effect compared to that originating from non-EU countries: consistent with 
                                                        
12 This is not to say that they may not have positive vertical spillovers, or indeed macroeconomic 
and political effects, as discussed in the relevant literatures (see, inter alia, Fry et al, 1995 and 
Grabbe, 2006).  
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the evidence of Table 1, the latter has a negative effect which is over twice as 
large (more negative) and significant now even at 1% compared to the 
corresponding regression of Table 1. In contrast, the effect of EU presence is 
only marginally negative (it is sixteen times smaller than the estimated non-
European effect) and highly insignificant (the associated p-value is 0.81). This 
result is consistently derived also in the specification including interactive 
year-country fixed effects, as well as in the fixed-effects specification (which 
includes firm-specific controls as well as time dummies) and in the quadratic 
specification (with EU origin having the hump-shaped effect found also in 
col.5 of Table 1 and non-EU origin having a strictly linear negative effect – 
results not shown but available upon request). Interestingly, the effect of EU-
originating foreign presence becomes positive and significant (p-value=0.057) 
when we drop the country fixed-effects, suggesting in fact some degree of 
geographical selectivity for European firms (into countries with higher firm 
productivity); while the effect of non-EU firms becomes even more negative 
and is now significant even at 0.1%. The conclusion is clear that the impact of 
EU-originating FDI is indeed distinctive and less negative than that of FDI 
originating from other parts of the world.  
The remainder of Table 2 shows how these results change for different 
regional host-country blocks. Columns 3-5 report the results for the total 
measure of foreign presence separately for the three regional blocks of interest 
here, namely the New Member States of the 2004 accession (CEE), the 
Candidate Countries of the Balkans (SEE), and the countries belonging to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership (ENP). As can 
be seen, the estimated effect from foreign presence in the CEE region tends to 
follow the hump-shaped relationship identified earlier for the full sample and 
found also elsewhere in the literature (Girma and Görg, 2007; Monastiriotis 
and Alegria, 2011). The effect remains non-linear (hump-shaped) in the case 
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of the SEE region but here it is not statistically significant. Arguably, the 
specificities of the region (including its slow transition, the legacy of conflicts 
and the low capital base and levels of development) may go a long way in 
explaining the statistical weakness of the observed hump-shaped relationship. 
In contrast to what is found for the CEE and SEE regions, the estimated 
horizontal spillover in the ENP region follows a U-curve, with the linear term 
being negative and statistically significant (p-value=0.06) and the quadratic 
term being positive but not significant statistically.13 For firms in this region, it 
appears that foreign presence produces predominantly negative externalities 
(e.g., market-capture effects), as domestic firms presumably lack the degree of 
sophistication (absorptive capacity) that would allow them to gain from the 
foreign presence.  
Table 2. Impact of foreign ownership by region of origin and destination  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  ALL ALL CEE SEE ENP CEE SEE ENP 
Employment 0.849*** 0.671*** 0.882*** 0.721*** 0.874*** 0.882*** 0.721*** 0.875*** 
(0.014) (0.021) (0.011) (0.042) (0.017) (0.011) (0.042) (0.017) 
Fixed assets 0.184*** 0.368*** 0.159*** 0.269*** 0.173*** 0.160*** 0.268*** 0.173*** 
(0.016) (0.025) (0.014) (0.044) (0.015) (0.013) (0.044) (0.016) 
Horizontal 
(total) 
  0.429* 0.511 -0.516*    
  (0.236) (0.409) (0.258)    
Horizontal 
squared 
(total) 
  -0.686** -0.826 0.549    
  (0.289) (0.573) (0.330)    
EU horizontal -0.0224 0.549*    0.469 0.982** 0.313 
(0.093) (0.270)    (0.327) (0.439) (0.377) 
EU horizontal 
squared 
     -0.713 -1.559** -0.130 
     (0.413) (0.590) (0.553) 
Non-EU 
horizontal 
-0.364*** -1.054***    0.009 -1.482*** -0.883* 
(0.094) (0.277)    (0.336) (0.505) (0.426) 
Non-EU 
horizontal sq. 
     -0.439 1.479** 0.807* 
     (0.403) (0.662) (0.449) 
Constant 7.362*** 5.721*** 7.952*** 6.357*** 6.820*** 7.962*** 6.290*** 6.777*** 
 (0.252) (0.271) (0.175) (0.534) (0.181) (0.170) (0.510) (0.185) 
Fixed effects C, Y, S Y, S C, Y, S C, Y, S C, Y, S C, Y, S C, Y, S C, Y, S 
Observations 9,292 9,292 4,225 1,579 3,488 4,225 1,579 3,488 
R-squared 0.814 0.723 0.853 0.750 0.800 0.853 0.751 0.800 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *, ** and *** show significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels.  
                                                        
13 The negative linear effect is also derived from alternative specifications, including when we 
control for firm-specific fixed-effects, when we add interactive country-year fixed effects, and 
when we remove the quadratic term (results available upon request). 
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In the last part of Table 2 we examine how these effects are differentiated 
depending on the origin of the foreign investor. Consistent with what we saw 
before, in all cases EU-originating FDI appears to have a productivity 
advantage compared to FDI from outside the EU. The EU effect is statistically 
significant in the SEE region, with a positive effect in sectors with low 
concentration of EU-firm presence but a negative overall effect for high 
concentrations (above 65%). In contrast, the presence of non-EU firms in the 
SEE region, as well as in the ENP countries, produces a U-shaped effect, 
which however remains negative for all possible values of foreign 
concentration (up to 100%). Figure 1presents in graphical form the size of the 
estimated effects across all possible values of foreign-firm concentration by 
region of destination and region of origin.  
 
 
Figure 1. Estimated foreign ownership spillovers by region of origin and destination  
 
(a) EU ownership    (b) Non-EU ownership 
Note: Estimated total effects of horizontal FDI (sectoral share of foreign-owned firms) on 
domestic firms’ productivity (vertical axis) across different levels of horizontal FDI (horizontal 
axis), by origin of foreign investors and region of destination – derived from cols 6-8 of Table 2.  
 
 
Overall, the evidence in this section offers support to our underlying 
hypothesis that the origin of FDI matters, not only in itself but also in relation 
to the recipient country. In the CEECs, where levels of development are 
comparatively (to the other regions) high and foreign investment is more 
mature, the effect of foreign presence is similar (in shape) between European 
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and non-European concentrations, albeit still more positive for the former – at 
least for sectors with average concentrations of foreign presence. In contrast, 
in the other two regions, where levels of development and firms’ absorptive 
capacities are lower, the estimated impacts differ drastically between 
European and non-European investments. Especially in SEE, European 
ownership appears associated with positive productivity spillovers for all but 
a very small minority of cases14, while non-European ownership produces 
negative spillovers throughout.  In the case of the ENP countries, the non-
European effect is flatter but still negative throughout; whereas the effect of 
European ownership tends to be positive almost in a linear fashion – albeit 
without passing the conventional thresholds of statistical significance. Still, 
the result suggests to us that European investments – even in this region, 
where EU’s involvement is much less significant but still preferential and, 
arguably, highly influential – produce more advantageous spillovers 
compared to investments originating from other world regions. 
 
iii. Geographical impact 
Notwithstanding the findings about the distinctive role of European FDI, our 
overall results suggest that foreign presence has rather limited intra-industry 
effects. In this sub-section we examine whether this is due to a scale issue, as 
our attention thus far has been on country-wide sectoral spillovers. We start 
by examining whether intra-industry spillovers operate more strongly at the 
local level (within regions). Despite our prior expectations, based at least on 
the body of knowledge deriving from the knowledge spillovers literature, the 
concentration of foreign presence within region-sector clusters (i.e., within 
sectors within regions) is not found to be associated with higher levels of 
                                                        
14 The effect becomes negative at foreign ownership shares above 65%, which corresponds to 
less than 3% of cases in our sample of SEE firms.  
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productivity for domestic firms in the cluster. As is shown in col.1 of Table 3, 
the effect is negative but highly insignificant and, moreover, it remains so 
across alternative specifications (firm-specific fixed-effects, interactive 
dummies, etc – results not shown but available upon request). As was the 
case before, concentration seems to play an important role in this relationship, 
but this time the hump-shaped coefficients fail the test of statistical 
significance (col.2). It should be noted here, however, that when we split our 
sample across destination groups (not shown) we find a very strong and 
highly significant hump-shaped relationship in the CEE group of countries 
but no significant relationship in the SEE and ENP groups. For the CEE group 
this result suggests that FDI spillovers in this region are rather localised – and, 
as before, they only get exhausted at very high sectoral-regional 
concentrations of foreign presence (above 75%). For the other two groups of 
recipient countries, the results confirm the earlier conclusion that spillovers 
are at best weak; and in this case, they also appear not to be particularly 
localised.  
Concerning the EU – non-EU split, again we find consistent evidence of an EU 
‘advantage’. The impact of non-European foreign presence is found to be 
negative and statistically significant both in the sample as a whole (col.3) and 
in each recipient region individually (results not shown). In contrast, the 
estimated impact of European presence is positive but not statistically 
significant in the full sample but obtains a hump-shaped effect in the CEE and 
SEE sub-samples (significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively) and a 
linear positive effect in the ENP region (significant at 5%). As these results are 
stronger than the ones obtained in Table 2 (for the nationwide sectoral shares 
of foreign presence), it seems safe to conclude that the effect of foreign 
presence is rather localised, in the sense that it is stronger inside the recipient 
sub-national areas where the foreign presence is concentrated. This 
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localisation effect of the FDI spillovers only applies, however, to specific 
cases, predominantly of European FDI and usually in cases where foreign 
presence does not dominate the sectors and regional economies where it is 
located (low-to-medium concentrations of foreign presence).  
Our next question, then, concerns the possible spatial heterogeneity in these 
sector-wide and sector-region specific (localised) spillovers. Column 4 shows 
the estimated spillover effects of country-wide foreign presence in a sector, 
separated between firms that are located in capital-city and non-capital-city 
(‘peripheral’) regions within each sector. The effect appears to be strongly 
negative in peripheral regions and positive but not significant in the capitals. 
The result is even stronger and even more emphatic in the case of the region-
specific measure of foreign presence (col.5), which shows now a positive and 
statistically significant effect in capital-city regions and an adverse effect in 
peripheral regions which is now significant even at the 1% level. When we re-
specify these models in quadratic form (columns 6 and 7), the results remain 
consistent. Regions of capital cities benefit more from foreign presence (with a 
hump-shaped effect), whereas the rest of the regions do not enjoy positive 
productivity spillovers. From results not shown, it appears that destination 
geographies matter here too: the hump-shaped capital-region effect is 
stronger in the CEE region and weakest in the ENP region; while the negative 
spillover effect found for non-capital regions is strongest in the ENP region 
(significant at 1%) and weakest in the CEE. These results point again to the 
issue of absorption capacity, as we find spillovers to be positive in the more 
developed regions of the most developed countries in our sample (capital 
regions of CEE countries) and to be most negative in the least developed 
regions of the least developed countries in our sample (peripheral regions in 
the ENP group).  
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Table 3. Local and spatial effects of foreign ownership  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Employment 0.849*** 0.849*** 0.849*** 0.848*** 0.849*** 0.848*** 0.848*** 0.853*** 
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0130) 
Fixed assets 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 
(0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0181) 
FP (region-sector) -0.0213 0.143       
(0.0606) (0.120)       
FP^2 (region-sector) 
 
-0.240       
 
(0.145)       
EU FP (region-sector) 
  
0.0680      
  
(0.0812)      
Non-EU FP (region-
sector)   
-0.309**      
  
(0.134)      
Interactions        
Capital regions (x) …         
FP (sector)     0.187  0.715**   
   (0.113)  (0.279)   
FP (sector-region)      0.183*  0.771***  
    (0.0871)  (0.184)  
FP^2 (sector)       -0.889**   
     (0.326)   
FP^2 (sector-region)       -0.909***  
      (0.224)  
EU FP (region-sector)        0.238** 
       (0.0918) 
Non-EU FP (sector)        -0.176 
       (0.181) 
Other regions (x) …         
FP (sector)    -0.157**  -0.250   
   (0.0689)  (0.168)   
FP (sector-region)     -0.171***  -0.297**  
    (0.0590)  (0.136)  
FP^2 (sector)      0.194   
     (0.235)   
FP^2 (sector-region)       0.218  
      (0.186)  
EU FP (region-sector)        0.0108 
       (0.0911) 
Non-EU FP (sector)         -0.340*** 
       (0.109) 
Constant 7.353*** 7.346*** 7.349*** 7.366*** 7.389*** 7.368*** 7.391*** 7.103*** 
(0.258) (0.258) (0.254) (0.250) (0.255) (0.250) (0.256) (0.269) 
Observations 9,292 9,292 9,292 9,292 9,292 9,292 9,292 9,292 
R-squared 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.825 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *, ** and *** show significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. All regressions include country, year and industry fixed effects and have been estimated 
with OLS. 
 
The last column of Table 3 reports the results from the model that examines 
the capital – periphery distinction separately for EU and non-EU firm 
ownership shares.15 Consistent with all our previous results, EU-originating 
                                                        
15 While experimenting with a number of alternative specifications, in Table 3 we only report the 
most interesting of the obtained results. Full results can be made available upon request.  
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FDI appears to have an advantage relative to non-EU FDI in both types of 
regions. The EU effect is positive and statistically significant in capital cities 
and positive but highly insignificant outside capital-city regions; it is 
moreover stronger for foreign presence within the region-sector cells. In other 
words, the effect of EU-originating FDI seems to be positive in capital-city 
regions and rather localised. In contrast, the effect of FDI of non-EU origin is 
non-localised (stronger within nationwide sector cells) and it is non-positive 
(negative but not significant statistically) in capital-city regions but 
significantly negative (even at the 1% level) in peripheral regions.  
All of these results point to the same conclusion: although the presence of 
foreign-ownership in a sector is often associated with non-positive 
productivity spillovers, invariably the largest benefits, even in cases where 
the overall effect is negative, accrue to firms located in capital-city regions and 
are accounted for by concentrations of European firms. There are two 
important implications emanating from this for our sample countries. First, 
foreign-firm presence, even in cases where its overall effect is positive (e.g., 
moderate concentration, European origin), has a detrimental spatial effect as 
it tends to increase the distance (in terms of firms’ total factor productivity) 
between capital-city regions – which usually possess higher levels of 
development and greater agglomeration and other advantages – and the rest 
of the country. Second, foreign-firm presence, again even in ‘suitable’ cases 
(moderate concentration, in capital-city regions), is not unequivocally 
beneficial but it is only so when it concerns investments originating from 
European firms. Either way, however, it is clear from our results that foreign-
frim presence – European or not – magnifies regional disparities in the host 
economies of the CEE, SEE and ENP regions.  
 
Origin of FDI and domestic productivity spillovers 
  28
Conclusions 
The literature on the intra-industry productivity spillovers of foreign firm 
ownership has made significant advances over the last ten years or so, and 
has expanded notably, producing a large body of empirical evidence on the 
nature of these spillovers and the range of factors that condition them 
(including factors such as technological distance and absorptive capacity, 
domestic institutions and legal frameworks, firm size and export-orientation, 
etc). Despite these advances, only a handful of studies exist that examine the 
issue of the origin and type of the foreign investor as one of the mediating 
factors determining the size and direction of spillovers. Similarly, and despite 
the theoretical origins of this literature in the broader literatures of knowledge 
spillovers and agglomeration economies, studies that examine the 
geographical scale and spatial distribution of these productivity spillovers 
accruing from foreign ownership are really scarce.  
This paper takes up these observations and examines these two issues (origin 
of investor and geography of spillovers) for a case of particular interest and 
policy significance. The European Neighbourhood Policy, launched by the 
European Union in 2004 at the time of the EU’s eastward enlargement, has 
been an innovation that has transformed the Union’s external relations with 
its near neighbourhood and has linked them inexorably with processes of 
institutional adaptation (Europeanisation) and economic integration (trade 
liberalisation and preferential agreements). Because of this, and despite its 
political and foreign-policy origins, the ENP has become today one of the 
main economic-policy instruments in the Continent and has accelerated and 
intensified economic flows and interactions between countries and between 
businesses across the two regional blocks. These dynamics necessitate an 
examination of the usefulness and economic benefits of processes of economic 
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integration and the identification of any possible unintended consequences 
that they may have.  
Within this context, this paper examined the size and direction of 
productivity spillovers accruing to the domestic economies of the countries in 
the eastern part of the ENP region and, comparatively, the countries 
belonging to the CEE and SEE regions. We examined the differentiated 
spillovers generated by European and non-European FDI, at the national-
sectoral level, and proceeded to investigate the geographical scale and spatial 
differentiation of these effects, asking whether positive FDI spillovers, which 
may be beneficial nationally, may be exacerbating regional disparities and 
existing spatial asymmetries. 
Our results offer a range of interesting findings, three of which we want to 
emphasise here. First, EU-originating FDI appears to have a ‘productivity 
advantage’ over investments from other parts of the world, in the sense that it 
tends to generate greater productivity spillovers for domestic firms or, at 
least, less significant negative effects. This result is consistent across 
specifications and for different definitions of our policy variable. Although 
theoretically it is possible that this result may emanate purely from 
technology and other advantages possessed by European firms relative to 
other investors, in practice it is difficult to argue that European multinationals 
would be systematically more advanced than multinationals of other origins. 
If this assertion is valid, then it can be argued that at least part of this 
productivity advantage must be related to the process of EU association, 
which gives a preferential access to European firms in the economies 
examined here and harmonises their institutional and legal environment.  
Second, FDI spillovers, including European ones, have not reached their 
maximum value in the ENP region. In the CEECs, which today form part of 
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the EU, and even more in the SEECs, where the EU has a deeper involvement, 
such spillovers are very positive and strong. This in turn suggests that further 
approximation with the countries of the region and further intensification of 
economic links and capital flows may prove to be increasingly beneficial for 
the domestic economies of the countries in the ‘eastern neighbourhood’.  
Third, the observed productivity spillovers, although not particularly 
localised, tend to be significantly stronger and more positive for firms located 
in the capital-city regions of the recipient countries. As FDI tends to 
concentrate in, or near, capital cities anyway, it follows that it indeed acts to 
amplify within-country spatial disparities. European FDI appears to have the 
strongest contribution to this adverse geographical effect, partly owing to the 
fact that its effect is also stronger, or more positive, at the national level. This 
finding raises important concerns about the role and consequences of foreign 
capital inflows in the former transition countries of the eastern and 
southeastern periphery of Europe. Processes of transition, development and 
internationalisation (openness) are long known to be related to widening 
regional disparities, as they benefit, at least in their initial stages, the most 
dynamic, extrovert and human-capital abundant parts of an economy. If the 
role of FDI is similarly geographically inequitable and spatially uneven, 
policy-makers in FDI-receiving countries face an important policy problem, in 
the form of a trade-off between higher technology transfers and higher 
regional disparities.   
This observation leads us to the main conclusion that we wish to draw from 
our analysis in this paper. Through its policy of approximation and 
conditionality, the EU has affected in fundamental ways the market 
orientation and external political and economic relations of the countries in its 
neighbourhood. This influence, and the very gravitational pull of the EU 
economy (even during the time of the Eurozone crisis), limits the ability of 
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countries in the EU periphery to control the pace at, and areas in, which 
processes of integration and market openness take place. In this sense, the EU 
shares a responsibility, together with the countries concerned, to address any 
adverse consequences and any imbalances generated by these processes of 
approximation and openness. From this perspective, the issue of spatial 
imbalances, and in particular of the impact that the processes of 
approximation and openness may have on these, is not only important but 
also an issue of shared EU responsibility. Although the evidence we present 
in this paper is novel and, as such, requires further scrutiny in future 
replications, our results provide a clear indication that the effects of FDI in the 
European periphery, and particularly of European FDI there, are favouring 
geographical differentiation and regional disparities. If this is true, then the 
recommendation follows that the ‘neighbourhood’ policies of the EU should 
obtain a much more specific geographical focus and attention, and develop 
actions and interventions that will seek to identify and correct the regional 
imbalances that are generated by otherwise well-intentioned and probably 
on-the-aggregate beneficial policies 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Sample size and foreign ownership shares by country and region 
Country 
Domestic firms 
 
Foreign firms 
(>10%) 
%sales by 
foreign-owned 
firms 
CEE 
   
Bulgaria 1423 205 27.8% 
Czech 
Republic 
556 84 28.2% 
Estonia 512 116 32.9% 
Hungary 777 180 33.5% 
Latvia 481 100 36.1% 
Lithuania 540 75 20.3% 
Poland 1249 136 14.2% 
Romania 940 149 14.8% 
Slovakia 418 70 18.4% 
Slovenia 575 79 18.8% 
SEE 
   
Albania 437 70 18.2% 
Bosnia 461 54 8.5% 
Croatia 897 116 14.7% 
FYROM 429 64 20.3% 
Montenegro 77 5 8.0% 
Serbia 532 78 25.2% 
Turkey 1165 38 4.5% 
ENP 
   
Armenia 638 65 12.8% 
Azerbaijan 393 51 22.5% 
Belarus 558 100 9.1% 
Georgia 493 59 15.0% 
Kazakhstan 962 91 10.3% 
Kyrgyz 378 78 17.2% 
Moldova 638 88 20.2% 
Russia 1328 115 7.8% 
Tajikistan 550 51 10.8% 
Ukraine 1061 379 21.5% 
Uzbekistan 711 134 13.4% 
Total 19179 2830 17.9% 
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